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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(3)(a) (Supp. 1989) grants the Supreme 
Court appellate jurisdiction over judgments of the Court of 
Appeals. This Court granted a petition for writ of certiorari in 
this case on August 31, 1989, based on the statutory authority of 
Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(5) (Supp. 1989). This matter was an appeal 
to the Court of Appeals by the Estate of Robert E. Erickson, the 
respondent herein, from an order of the Third Judicial District 
Court, Salt Lake County, the Honorable John A. Rokich presiding, 
admitting a handwritten document to probate as the holographic 
will of Robert E. Erickson, the decedent. On appeal, the Court 
of Appeals reversed the trial court. 
STATEMENT OF QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Does the holographic document which is entirely in dece-
dents handwriting and contains the decedent's handwritten name 
in the body of the document satisfy the holographic will require-
ments of Utah Code Ann. §75-2-503, including the requirement that 
the holographic will contain the Decedent's "signature?" 
2. Was the issue of whether or not the holographic document 
contained the decedent's signature properly before the Court of 
Appeals? 
REFERENCE TO OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL REPORTS 
The Decision of the Utah Court of Appeals in this matter is 
reported in Estate of Erickson v. Misaka, 766 P. 2d 1085 (Utah App. 
1988) and 98 Utah Adv. Rep. 64 (Ct. App. Dec. 23, 1988). 
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CONTROLLING STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann, §75-2-503 (1978). Holographic Will: 
A will which does not comply with section 75-2-
502 is valid as a holographic will, whether or 
not witnessed, if the signature and the materi-
al provisions are in the handwriting of the 
testator. If there are several holographic 
wills in existence with conflicting provisions, 
the holographic will which is established by 
date or other circumstances to be the will that 
was last executed shall control. If it is 
impossible to determine which will was last 
executed, the consistent provisions of the 
several wills shall be considered valid and the 
inconsistent provisions shall be considered 
invalid, 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This case is a formal petition for the probate of a handwrit-
ten document consisting of three cards as the holographic will of 
Robert E. Erickson, the decedent. The holographic document was 
admitted to probate by the Third District Court, Salt Lake County, 
the Honorable John A. Rokich presiding. On appeal, the Utah State 
Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, finding that the 
holographic document did not meet the requirements of Utah Code 
Ann. §75-2-503 to qualify as a holographic will because the 
proponent of the will, Mr. Misaka, had not proved that the 
decedent intended his handwritten name contained in the body of 
the document to be his signature. 
Statement of the Facts 
Robert E. Erickson ("decedent") died on June 16, 1983. A will 
dated June 9, 1955 was admitted to probate and First Interstate 
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Bank, N.A., was appointed as personal representative of the 
estate. (R. 19-22, 26-27). The personal representative of the 
estate is the respondent in this matter. Tatsumi Misaka, the 
petitioner herein, filed a petition (R. 70-81) seeking the probate 
of a holographic document consisting of three 3" x 5" cards, which 
were discovered among the effects of the decedent following the 
probate of the prior will (R. 84). 
The holographic document, a copy of which is located in the 
Appendix, begins as follows: 
Last Will & Test 
I Robert E. Erickson do hereby state that I 
leave and bequeath to the following persons of 
my family and others.... 
Approximately two-thirds of the way down the first card, in the 
middle of a sentence, the writing changes from blue to black ink. 
The remainder of the first card and all of the second and third 
cards are written in the black ink. Additionally, the underlined 
date "8/22/73" was subsequently added to the upper right hand 
corner of the first card, as shown by the underlined date being 
in black ink and partially covering the letter "L" at the begin-
ning of the words "Last Will & Test." (3-P). The holographic 
document contains the decedent*s handwritten name in the introduc-
tory or exordium clause, but does not contain a signature at its 
end. 
Under the holographic document, Mr. Misaka is the beneficiary 
of a one-half interest in a Park City condominium and is noted as 
the owner of a one-fourth interest in the "F. H. Store." (3-P). 
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Mr, Misaka and the decedent were co-investors and partners prior 
to decedent's death (R. 131), and Mr. Misaka had filed a claim 
against the estate for an interest in the Park City condominium 
and other properties based on the business association between Mr. 
Misaka and decedent (R. 75-81), which claim was denied by the 
personal representative. The personal representative objected to 
the probate of the holographic document (R. 82-83). 
At trial, the holographic document was received into evidence 
and Mr. Misaka presented expert testimony that the entire hologra-
phic document, which includes the name of the decedent in the body 
of the document, was in the decedent's handwriting. (R. 143). 
The personal representative presented evidence regarding the 
physical form of the handwritten name of decedent, testamentary 
intent, and testamentary capacity. Following the trial, the court 
rejected the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and the Order 
submitted by the Personal Representative (R. 112-119) and accepted 
the Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law (R. 122-125) sub-
mitted by Mr. Misaka. The court found that the holographic 
document was entirely in the decedent's handwriting, that the name 
of the decedent in the document is the decedent's signature, and 
that the decedent intended the holographic document to be his 
will. Based on those Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the 
court entered an Order admitting the holographic document to 
probate as the will of the decedent. (R. 120-121). 
On appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals, the personal represen-
tative raised two points: Point I, "There was no testamentary 
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intent to have the cards made as the holographic will of the 
decedent," and Point II, "The nature of the cards themselves fail 
to establish a testamentary disposition of the property of the 
decedent." The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's 
decision on a third issue, finding that Mr. Misaka had failed to 
prove that the decedent intended that his handwritten name in the 
body of the holographic document be his "signature," and therefore 
that Mr, Misaka had failed to meet his burden of establishing 
prima facia proof that the holographic document contained the 
decedent's signature as required by Utah Code Ann. §75-2-503. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Point I 
The Utah Court of Appeals erroneously found that Mr. Misaka 
had failed to meet his burden of proof that the decedent intended 
his handwritten name in the holographic document to be his 
signature. The location of the handwritten name in the document's 
exordium clause, which provides "I Robert E. Erickson do hereby 
state that I leave and bequeath ..." and is located immediately 
below the title "Last Will and Test," properly allows an inference 
to be drawn that the decedent intended the handwritten name to 
authenticate the document and serve as his signature. The 
subsequent dating of the will by the decedent further acts to 
adopt the handwritten name as the decedent's signature. 
Point II 
The personal representative did not properly raise at trial 
or on appeal the issue of whether the decedent intended the 
5 
handwritten name to be his signature. The two points raised on 
appeal were "There was not testamentary intent to have the cards 
made as the holographic will of the decedent," and "The nature of 
the cards themselves fail to establish a testamentary disposition 
of the property of the decedent." The Court of Appeals was in 
error in reversing the trial court based on the issue of whether 
the decedent intended the handwritten name to be his signature 
when the issue had not been properly raised at trial or on appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
MR. MISAKA MET HIS BURDEN OF PROOF THAT THE HOLOGRAPHIC 
DOCUMENT CONTAINS THE DECEDENT'S SIGNATURE. 
A. The Language Of The Holographic Document Establishes The 
Decedent*s Intent That His Handwritten Name Be His 
Signature. 
Title 75 of the Utah Code Ann. is the Utah Uniform Probate 
Code, which adopted the Uniform Probate Code for the State of 
Utah. See 1975 Laws of Utah, Ch. 150. The execution requirements 
for wills under the Utah Uniform Probate Code ("UUPC") are set 
forth in Utah Code Ann. §§75-2-502 and -503 (1978). Those 
sections provide in relevant part as follows: "Except as provided 
for holographic wills, . . . every will shall be in writing signed 
by the testator . . . and shall be signed by at least two persons 
each of whom witnessed either the signing or the testator's 
acknowledgement of the signature or of the will." Utah Code Ann. 
§75-2-502 (1978). Utah Code Ann. §75-2-503 (1978) provides an 
exception to those execution requirements for holographic wills: 
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"A will which does not comply with Section 75-2-502 is valid as 
a holographic will, whether or not witnessed, if the signature and 
the material provisions are in the handwriting of the testator," 
Neither §75-2-502 nor -503 requires that the testator's 
signature appear at the end of the will; in fact, the official 
comments to the Uniform Probate Code specifically refute such a 
requirement: 
There is no requirement that the testator's 
signature be at the end of the will; thus, if 
he writes his name in the body of the will and 
intends it to be his signature, this would 
satisfy the statute. The intent is to validate 
wills that meet the minimum formalities of the 
statute. 
Editorial Board Comment to Section 2-502 of the Uniform Probate 
Codec 
The Court of Appeals found that Mr. Misaka had failed to prove 
that the decedent intended that his handwritten name in the body 
of the document be his "signature, " and therefore held that Mr. 
Misaka failed to meet his prima facia burden of proof of due 
execution. In its Opinion, the Court of Appeals interpreted the 
signature requirement of the Utah statute as requiring an authen-
tication showing the finality of the will: 
"A decedent's handwritten name in the body of 
the purported holographic will is not, by 
itself, prima facia evidence that the document 
contains the decedent's signature. In the 
context of section 75-2-503, such a handwritten 
name must have been written with the intent 
that it operate as an authentication of the 
document as a will in order for it to be a 
signature. The purpose of our statutory scheme 
is to require a course of conduct which assures 
that a person's will is reduced to handwriting, 
and when handwritten, that the intention is to 
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have the writing take legal effect be indicated 
by a signature which records the fact. The 
signature requirement shows that the writer 
finally approved the writing and meant for it 
to be operative as a testamentary instrument." 
Estate of Erickson v. Misaka, 766 P.2d 1085, 1088 (Utah App. 
1988). The Court based this conclusion on Utah Code Ann. §68-3-
12(2)(r) (Supp. 1989), which defines a signature as "includ[ing] 
any name, mark, or sign written with the intent to authenticate 
any instrument or writing." 
The Court of Appeal's interpretation would be consistent with 
a statute requiring that a will be signed at the end, but is 
inconsistent with the UUPC and the Editorial Board Comment to 
Section 2-502 of the Uniform Probate Code which allow a signature 
in the body of the will. In allowing wills to be signed in the 
body, the UUPC implicitly rejects the possible purpose that the 
signature act to show the finality of a will. A will which is 
signed in the body is necessarily signed before the written 
language of the will is complete. Thus, the "signature" require-
ment of Utah Code Ann. §75-2-503 should not be construed to mean 
that the handwritten name must be placed on the will to show a 
final approval of the completed document. Imposing a requirement 
of a specific intent that the handwritten name in the body of the 
will be put there for the purpose of authenticating the completed 
will defeats the legislative intent of allowing a will to be 
signed in the body, and also defeats the broad purpose of the 
Uniform Probate Code to "validate wills whenever possible." 
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General Comment to Part 5, Editorial Board Comment of the Uniform 
Probate Code. 
The Opinion of the Court of Appeals implies further that the 
signature requirement under the UUPC is also intended to protect 
against deletions. "Without more, it is an inadequate guard 
against writing being deleted..." Erickson, 766 P.2d at 1088. 
Again, such a purpose is consistent only with a will statute 
requiring a signature at the end. The intent of the UUPC to allow 
a will to be signed in the body implicitly indicates that the 
purposes for the signature requirement do not include safeguarding 
the will against deletions, because a signature in the body of the 
will does not serve to indicate an absolute ending, as a signature 
at the end would. 
The Court of Appeals' focus on the lack of an after-the-fact 
authentication failed to give proper consideration to the language 
in the introductory, or exordium, clause of the will, which places 
the handwritten name in a context where an inference can properly 
be drawn that the decedent intended the handwritten name as his 
signature. The holographic document provides "I Robert E. 
Erickson do hereby state that I leave and bequeath . . . " imme-
diately underneath the title "Last Will & Test." The language "do 
hereby state" shows the intent of the Testator to validate, or 
"authenticate," the will with the handwritten name which immedi-
ately precedes those words. The language in the exordium clause 
demonstrates the decedent's understanding of the importance and 
legal significance of the document, and further shows the dece-
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dentf s operative intent that the document he was preparing serve 
as his will. 
The courts in other states have recognized a handwritten name 
located in an exordium clause is evidence of the decedent's intent 
to validate or authenticate the will, and thus acts as a signa-
ture- In Smith v. McDonald, 252 Ark, 931, 481 S.W.2d 741 (1972) 
the court validated the will which began "I, Julian Leland 
Rutherford . . . do hereby make, publish and declare this to be 
my last will and testament • . ." The same court, in Nelson v. 
Texarkana Historical Socyy and Museum, 257 Ark. 394, 516 S.W.2d 
882 (1974) found the signature requirement not met where the 
testator?s handwritten name only appeared in the context of 
stating that certain property was given in memory of the testator. 
The Arkansas court relied heavily on the dissenting opinion of 
Justice Traynor in In re Bloch's Estate, 39 Cal.2d 570, 248 P.2d 
21 (1952) in distinguishing the cases. 
In Bloch, an envelope with writing on both sides was submitted 
for probate. The only place where the decedent's name appeared 
was in reference to part of her property in the phrase "Bonds 
belonging solely to Helene I. Bloch." The California Supreme 
Court found that the name was properly regarded as placed on the 
will with authenticating intent because the instrument disclosed 
a testamentary intent and was complete in the sense that the 
instrument did everything the decedent intended to do. Justice 
Traynor?s dissent focused on the context in which the handwritten 
name appeared in the will, distinguishing between a name in an 
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exordium clause identifying the decedent in relation to the 
testamentary act and a name merely identifying property of the 
decedent: 
"Regardless of where the name may appear in the 
instrument, there is always the possibility, of 
course, that it was intended as a signature. 
The mere existence of that possibility, how-
ever, is not enough to permit a reasonable 
inference that it was so intended. When the 
name is used to identify the decedent as the 
author of the alleged will as in Estate of 
Kinney, 16 Cal.2d 50, 104 P.2d 782 (fI, Anna 
Leona Graves Kinney, do bequeath all my posses-
sions to my four sisters'), or to identify the 
instrument as decedent's will as in Estate of 
Brooks, 214 Cal. 138, 4 P.2d 148 (fThis is my 
will - Elizabeth Ryan Brooks' ), and in addition 
the instrument appears to be a complete testa-
mentary document, it may reasonably be inferred 
that the name was placed where it was with the 
intention of executing the instrument. In such 
cases the name is linked to the alleged testa-
mentary act and the probabilities that it was 
intended as a signature are strong. In the 
present case, on the contrary, decedent's name 
appears only in the description of her 
property." 
In determining whether a holographic document is "complete" 
the California court has looked at whether the document had been 
finished or completed by the testator, not whether a complete 
disposition of property has been made. See In re Bloch's Estate, 
39 Cal.2d 570, 248 P.2d 21 (1952); In re Kinney's Estate, 16 
Cal.2d 50, 104 P. 2d 782 (1940) (will complete if testator appeared 
to "have "done everything they intended to do"). Further, in In 
re Rowe's Estate, 230 Cal. App. 442, 41 Cal. Rptr. 52 (1964), the 
court specifically rejected the argument that a holographic will 
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is invalid if it fails to dispose of all of the property of the 
decedent. 
The present instrument constitutes a completed document under 
the California rule. Nothing in the present document indicates 
that the decedent had not "done everything he intended to do," or 
that decedent intended to do anything else to finish the will. 
The subsequent dating of the will goes further to serve as an 
affirmative act of completing the will. Thus, the present 
holographic document meets the standard set out in Judge Traynorf s 
Bloch dissent to allow an inference that the handwritten name was 
placed with the intent that it be a signature. Allowing the 
probate of the present holographic document would also be consis-
tent with the decisions of the Arkansas court. 
The Utah Court of Appeals' Opinion states that in proper 
circumstances a handwritten name in the body of the will could be 
written with the intent to be a signature. Erickson, 766 P.2d at 
1088, fn. 3. The two cases cited by the court for that proposi-
tion in addition to Smith v. McDonald also support the probate of 
the present holographic document. Those cases found handwritten 
names in the body of the wills to be signatures based solely on 
language in the will, similar to the language in the present 
holographic document. See In re Estate of Glass, 165 Cal. App.2d 
380, 331 P.2d 1045 (1958) (signature requirement met where will 
provided ,fThis is Louis R. Glass I wish to Retract my last Will 
witch I left my sister Ester Glass now Mrss Zipkin & give my 
belongings to my Three Nefeu & Nice . . . .") and Burton v. Bell, 
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380 SoWo 2d 561 (Tex. 1964) (signature requirement met by exordium 
clause which provided "That I, Roy Wheeler Bell, of Harris Co. Tex 
being of sound disposing mind memory, do hereby make this my last 
will & testament, hereby revoking any & all other wills heretofore 
made by me"). 
In In re Estate of Fegley, 42 Colo. App. 47, 589 P.2d 80 
(1978), the court addressed the question of whether the testator's 
signature is required at the end of a will under Colorado's 
version of the Uniform Probate Code, which contains a holographic 
will provision identical to the relevant portion of Utah Code Ann. 
§75-2-503 (1978). The court held that "the intent of the testator 
-- not the location of his name -- is the crucial factor in 
determining whether a holographic will has been signed within the 
meaning of [the Colorado holographic will statute]." Id. at 81. 
The court determined that the testator lacked the necessary 
testamentary intent that a will have immediate effect because the 
holographic document contained the phrase "witness my hand . . .," 
followed by a blank signature space and an attestation clause, 
which the court saw as indicating that the testator intended to 
sign the will at a later date, and that the testator did not 
intend her name in the body of the will to be her signature. The 
conclusion of the court in Fegley is not inconsistent with the 
probate of the present document because the format of the Fegley 
document, which contained a blank signature space followed by an 
attestation clause, indicated that the testator intended to take 
further action to validate the will. 
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Finding that a will contains a signature in situations where 
the handwritten name is in the exordium clause is not contrary to 
the general statutory definition of "signature" contained in Utah 
Code Ann. §68-3-12(2)(r) (Supp. 1989) that a signature includes 
"any name, mark or sign written with the intent to authenticate 
any instrument or writing." The language preceding that defini-
tion provides that "[T]he following definitions shall be observed, 
unless the definition would be inconsistent with the manifest 
intent of the legislature, or repugnant to the context of the 
statute." Ld. at §68-3-12(2). By allowing signatures in the body 
of a will, the legislature has implicitly approved "authentica-
ting" the writing following a signature in the body of a will. 
It is unlikely that any holographic will would contain any 
language in the will itself indicating an intent to sign signifi-
cantly clearer than the language in the present holographic 
document. If the Court of Appeals' decision is upheld, the 
legislative intent to allow wills to be signed in the body of the 
document will be followed in name only, subject to a standard of 
proof regarding intent to sign which is effectively unmeetable. 
As the California Supreme Court stated in Estate of Black, 30 
Cal.3d 880, 641 P.2d 754 (1982): 
If testators are to be encouraged by a statute 
like ours to draw their own wills, the courts 
should not adopt, upon purely technical reason-
ing, a construction which would result in 
invalidating such wills in half the cases. 
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B. The Decedent's Subsequent Dating Of The Holographic 
Document Adopted The Handwritten Name As A Signature. 
In addition to the language in the exordium clause, the 
decedent dated the holographic document after it was written, 
thereby acknowledging and adopting the handwritten name in the 
exordium clause as his signature. In In re Kinney's Estate, 16 
Cal.2d 50, 104 P.2d 782 (1940), the California Supreme Court 
affirmed the probate of a will which began "I, Anna Leona Graves 
Kinney, do bequeath all my possessions to my four sisters who were 
living in 1923," but was otherwise unsigned. The court, in 
reviewing its prior decisions, stated: 
"Whenever it has appeared that a holographic 
testamentary instrument was a completed declar-
ation of the decedent's desires, such an 
instrument has been admitted to probate al-
though the decedent wrote his name only in the 
beginning of the declaration. This has been so 
even where there was no expression by the 
testator affirmatively adopting the name so 
placed as his signature to the will. Complete-
ness alone has been held sufficient evidence of 
the adoption of the name so placed as the 
authenticating signature of the testator and as 
a compliance with the statute which requires 
the will to be 'signed1." 
The court said that a will was not complete if it appeared from 
the instrument that the decedent had not "done everything they 
intended to do." See also Estate of McCarty, 27 Cal. Rptr. 94, 
211 Cal. App.2d 23 (1962) (signature adopted by underlining at 
later date). In the present case, the decedent's affirmative act 
of subsequently dating of the will goes beyond the standard of 
Kinney, and should be treated as adopting the handwritten name as 
a signature. 
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C. Decedent's Intent That The Handwritten Name Be His 
Signature Can Be Inferred From The Existence of Testamen-
tary Intent. 
The Court of Appeals' Opinion reads into the statute a 
specific intent requirement that the testator's handwritten name 
be "written with the intent that it operate as an authentication 
of the document as a will" to accompany the general intent 
requirement that testamentary intent be present. Erickson, 766 
P.2d at 1088. Reaching the conclusion that a person intended an 
entire document, including the handwritten name, to be a will, but 
that the will is invalid because no specific intent to sign the 
will is shown, is a conclusion that defies the purpose of the UUPC 
to validate wills whenever possible. If the handwritten name must 
be placed in the will with the specific intent of authenticating 
the completed document as a will, then the existence of testamen-
tary intent should allow an inference to be drawn that a name 
written in the body of the will was done with the intent that it 
be a signature and authenticate the document. The trial court 
found the existence of testamentary intent regarding the hologra-
phic document at issue, based on extrinsic evidence as well as the 
document itself. That testamentary intent infers the existence 
of the decedent? s intent that his handwritten name was placed in 
exordium clause to authenticate the will, especially in light of 
the surrounding language in the exordium clause. 
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D. The Form Of The Holographic Document Does Not Negate The 
Decedentf s Signatory Intent. 
The Court of Appeals1 Opinion addresses several aspects of 
the holographic document which should bear no weight as to either 
the issue of whether the will contains a signature or the issue 
of testamentary intent. The fact that the will is written on the 
unlined side of index cards does not in any way imply a lack of 
either intent to sign or testamentary intent. The relevant 
inquiry is what was written, not the material which contains the 
writing. The Utah Court of Appeals has recognized that immaterial 
language on pre-printed forms can be ignored in validating 
holographic wills. Estate of Fitzgerald, 738 P.2d 236 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1987). In the same manner, the use of the lined or the 
unlined side of the cards is irrelevant. 
The fact that the index cards are not attached to each other 
has no bearing on signatory intent or testamentary intent. This 
Court addressed that issue in In re Love's Estate, 75 Utah 342, 
285 P. 299 (1930), stating that several loose or detached sheets 
may serve as a will if, as is the present case, the sheets can be 
coherently read together as a will and contain nothing out of 
harmony with the general conception of a will. The present 
holographic document meets that standard. 
The Court of Appeals stated in its Opinion that the nature of 
the holographic document suggests that it was "unfinished or 
constituted a draft. In regard to the possibility that the cards 
were a "draft," an intent to later prepare a more formal document 
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does not preclude or detract from the testator? s intent in regard 
to an earlier document. In re Kuttler's Estate, 160 Cal. App.2d 
322, 325 P.2d 624, 631 (1958); Richberg v. Robbins, 33 Tenn. App. 
66, 228 S.W.2d 1019, 1022 (1950); In re Estate of Teubert, 298 
S.E.2d 456, 461 (W.Va. 1982). By allowing laymen to prepare 
holographic wills, the Utah statute sets a priority on carrying 
out the testatorfs intent rather than on the form of the instru-
ment. Admittedly, the holographic document at issue is crude, but 
that crudeness does not bear on the requisites for a valid 
holographic will. The fact that the first card was subsequently 
dated indicates that the will was completed. Nothing in the 
holographic document indicates that the decedent intended to take 
any further action to complete the will. The mere fact that the 
decedent could have disposed of additional property if he chose 
to do so does not support a conclusion that the will is incom-
plete, especially where decedent's prior will is not revoked by 
the holographic document at issue. Even if the holographic 
document was not completed, however, the broad purpose of the UUPC 
to validate wills whenever possible should support validating a 
will which otherwise meets the statutory requirements. In the 
present case, the clear language of the exordium clause and the 
subsequent dating are far better evidence of the testator?s intent 
to sign the will than the rough nature of the documents. 
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POINT II 
THE COURT OF APPEALS IMPROPERLY REVERSED THE TRIAL 
COURT BASED ON AN ISSUE NOT RAISED ON APPEAL 
The Personal Representative did not properly raise the issue 
at trial or on appeal of whether the decedent intended his 
handwritten name to be his "signature." As stated by the Court 
of Appeals in its Opinion in this case, "the parties and the court 
below seem to have focused on the broader issue of whether 
decedent intended these cards to be his will . . ., " Erickson, 766 
P.2d at 1087, and "[T]he findings and conclusions entered by the 
trial court, as well as the appellate briefs for both parties, 
fail to distinguish intent for these two different purposes." Id. 
at 1087 fn. 2. 
At the trial, the Personal Representative of the Estate raised 
only the issue that testamentary intent did not exist regarding 
the will. (R-128-175). See specifically the Personal Representa-
tive's argument for dismissal following Mr. Misakafs evidence (R 
147-150) and closing argument (R 171-173). In arguing that 
testamentary intent was lacking, the Personal Representative did 
cite In re Bloch's Estate, 39 Cal.2d 570, 248 P.2d 21 (1952) 
regarding affixing the signature with intent to authenticate (R-
148), but did so only as part of his argument that testamentary 
intent was lacking. Bloch's Estatef s broad holding finding an 
intent to sign where the handwritten name was used in describing 
property of the decedent actually supports a finding of an intent 
to sign in the present case. Further, while the issue of intent 
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to sign was also addressed in the Personal Representative's 
discussion of points (R 106-111), that document was filed some 17 
days after trial and 12 days after the Court's Order (R 104), and 
contained no legal authority on the issue except a citation to the 
Annotation at 19 A.L.R.2d 926 (1951). The Personal Represen-
tative's brief filed with the Court of Appeals addressed directly 
only the issue of testamentary intent, while in that discussion 
addressing intent to authenticate as part of that overall tes-
tamentary intent. 
While it is proper for a court on appeal to affirm based on 
grounds not raised at the trial level, see Branch v. Western 
Petroleum, Inc., 657 P.2d 267, 276 (Utah 1982), this Court has 
repeatedly held that an issue will not be considered for the first 
time on appeal in cases where the new issue is raised to reverse 
the trial court's decision. See, e.g., Trayner v. Cushing, 688 
P. 2d 856, 857 (Utah 1984). As the Court of Appeals stated in 
James v. Preston, 746 P.2d 799 (Utah App. 1987): 
"Theories or issues which are not apparent or 
reasonably discernable from the pleadings, 
affidavits, and exhibits will not be consider-
ed." Minnehoma Fin. Co. v. Pauli, 565 P.2d 
835, 838 (Wyo. 1977). In particular, even if 
pleadings are generously interpreted, if they 
are not supported by any factual showing or by 
the submission of legal authority, they are not 
presented for decision. 
In the present case, the Personal Representative's failure to 
clearly raise the issue of whether the decedent intended his 
handwritten name to be his signature falls within the perimeters 
20 
of James v. Preston, and should not have been considered by the 
Court of Appeals on appeal* 
Respectfully submitted this day of December, 1989. 
WATKISS & SAPERSTEIN 
/EN P. JONES 
Attorneys fcpr Petitioner, 
Tatsumi^Misaka 
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APPENDIX 
1= Copy of Court of Appeals' Decision, Estate of Erickson v. 
Misaka, 766 P.2d 1085 (Utah App. 1988). 
2. Copy of the Holographic Will of Robert E. Erickson. 
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ESTATE OF ERICSSON v. MISAKA Utah 1085 
Ctt«t»7t* PJ4 ISSS (UtafcAp*. IMS) 
In the Matter of the ESTATE OF Robert 
E. ERICKSON, Deceased, Appellant, 
T. 
Tatsumi MISAKA, Respondent 
No. 880139-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Dec. 23, 1988. 
A petition for probate of three hand-
written three-inch by five-inch cards as de-
cedent's holographic will was filed. The 
Third District Court, Salt Lake County, 
John A. Rolrich, J., admitted the cards to 
probate, and personal representative ap-
pealed. The Court of Appeals, Jackson, J., 
held that there was no evidence that dece-
dent's name was written in the introducto-
ry clause on one card with the intent that it 
constitute authentication of one or all of 
the cards as a will. 
Final judgment and order vacated. 
1. Wills *»133 
Decedent"8 intent is crucial factor in 
determining whether purported holograph-
ic will has been signed within meaning of 
statute pertaining to execution of wills. 
U.C.A.1953, 75-2-503. 
2. Wills *»130, 131 
Although statutory requirements for 
execution of valid holographic wills are 
minimal, statute Is mandatory and not di-
rectory; holographic document is invalid as 
will-despite deceased's clear intent that doc-
ument will be will-uniess document com-
plies with governing statute. U.C.A.1953, 
75-2-503. 
3. Wills *»133 
Decedent's handwritten name in body 
of purported holographic will is not, by 
itself, prima facie evidence that document 
contains decedent's signature; handwritten 
name must have been written with intent 
that it operate as authentication of doc-
ument as will in order for it to be signa-
ture. U.C.A.1953, 68-3-12(2Xr), 75-2-503. 
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^hree handwritten three-inch by five-
inen cards were inadmissible as holograph 
wiil despite fact that decedent's name was 
written in introductory clause on one card; 
there was no evidence that decedent's 
name was written with intent that it consti-
tute authentication of one or all of cards as 
will. U.CJU953, 75-2-503. 
5. Wills *»133 
It is possible for handwritten name at 
beginning of body of will to be written with 
intent that it be requisite signature, but 
there must be support in evidence for that 
intent 
Randy S. Ludlow (argued), Salt Lake 
City, for appellant 
HerscheU J. Saperstein, Ken P. Jones 
(argued), Watiris* and Campbell, Salt Lake 
City, for respondent 
Before GAKFF, BILLINGS and 
JACKSON, JJ. 
JACKSON, Judge: 
Robert E. Enckson died in June 1963. 
His forma* wffl, executed June 9,1955, was 
admitted to probate in July 1988 and the 
designated personal representative appoint-
ed In October 1986, respondent Tataumi 
Misaka ffled a petition for probate of three 
handwritten 3* x 5* cards as Erickson's 
holographic wilL In this appeal, the per-
sonal representative challenges the trial 
court's admission of the cards to probate. 
Because we conclude there is insufficient 
evidsoce that Erickson intended his hand-
written name on one of the cards to be his 
signature for purposes of Utah Code Ann. 
f 75-2-603 (1978), we vacate the final or-
der and judgment below. 
[1] The right to dispose of property by 
will is governed and controlled by statute. 
i. The iMue presented in this appeal in one of 
fir* iinpression in this state. Utah is one of 
sixteen states to adopt all or part of the Uniform 
Probate Code since 1972. See Utah Code Ann. 
S§ 75-1-101 to 75-8-101 (1978) (effective July 
1. 1977). Tne others are: Alaska (1973); Arizt> 
na(1974); Colorado (1974); Florida (1975); Ha-
waii (1976k Idaho (1972); Kentucky (1976) 
In re Woleott's Estate, 54 Utah 165, 180 P. 
169 (1919). The introductory Editorial 
Board Comment to Part 5 of the Utah 
Uniform Probate Code,1 Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 75-2-501 through -513 (1978), notes 
that its provisions are intended to validate 
a will whenever possible. This goal is 
achieved, in part, by keeping the formali-
ties for a written and attested will to a 
minimum, see section 75-2-502, and by au-
thorizing holographic wills written and 
signed by the testator 
A will which does not comply with 
section 75-2-502 [requiring, among other 
things, the signatures of two witnesses] 
is valid as a holographic will, whether or 
not witnessed, if the signature and the 
material provisions are in the handwrit-
ing of the testator 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-503 (1978) (empha-
sis added). As the Editorial Board Com-
ment to section 75-2-502 makes dear, the 
requisite signature need not be at the end 
of a will If the testator "writes his name 
in the body of the will and intends it to be 
his signature, this would satisfy the stat-
ute." (Emphasis added.) Thus, the dece-
dent's intent is the crucial factor in deter-
mining whether a purported holographic 
will has been signed within the meaning of 
section 75-2-503. See In re Estate ofFeg-
ley, 42 ColoJtpp. 47, 589 P 2d 80, 81 (1978) 
(construing identical statute). 
[2] Although the statutory require-
ments for execution of a valid holographic 
will are minimal, the statute is mandatory 
and not directory. A holographic doc-
ument is invalid as a will—despite the de-
ceased's clear intent that the document be 
a will—unless the document complies with 
the governing statute. In Re Woleott's 
Estate, 180 P. at 170 (decided under prior 
statute requiring holographic will to be en-
tirely written, dated, and signed by testa-
(only Art. VU, Part 1); Maine (1981); Michigan 
(1979); Minnesota (1975); Montana (1975); Ne-
braska (1977); New Mexico (1976); North Da-
kota (1975); and South Carolina (1987). Due to 
the recency of adoption by only a small minori-
ty of states, there is a dearth of case law con-
struing the provisions of the Uniform Probate 
Code. 
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tor). Sm 2 Puge an the Law of Wille 
$ 20.4 (W.^Boos t D. Parker ed. 1960). 
Under UBfch Code Ann. 9 75-3-407 
(1978), proponents of wills in contested 
cases always have the burden ot establish-
ing prima facie proof of their due execu-
tion, while contestants bear the burden of 
establishing lack of testamentary intent 
See In re Estate of Olschansky, 735 P.2d 
927, 929 (1987). 
The proof in support of probate must be 
sufficient to convince the court that the 
paper produced is the lawful will of the 
testator. 
A prima facie case is made when it is 
shown that all the requirements of law 
have been observed in tfce execution of 
the will, and unless such prima facie case 
is made the court should refuse probate 
even where probate is not contested. G. 
Thompson, The Law of Wills, 3rd Ed., 
9 199. 
In re Estate of Cmddock, 179 Mont 74, 
586 P.2d 292, 294 (1978) (proponent failed 
to establish prima facie case that purported 
holographic will was written entirely by 
testator, as required by statute). 
Applying these principles to the instant 
case, it was respondent Misaka's burden to 
make a prima facie showing that the pur-
ported holographic will contained the "sig-
nature" required by section 75-2-608. On 
this issue, respondent introduced only the 
three unnumbered and unattached cards, 
which were apparently discovered in a desk 
drawer along with other belongings of de-
cedent They read as follows, with unread-
able portions indicated: 
8/22/7$ Lift W01 + Teat I 
Robert E. Erieksoado 
hereby stats that I leave 
and tiuiaafi to the fol-
lowing p i w of my fam-
ily + other* as my demiae 
I f i a t to Jeeve to my wifo 
Dorothy 
the P.H. Store shall go V« 
to Dorothy V4 to REE 
Jr y« to Sheryl [unreada-
bk] the other Vi ia owned 
by T. Miaaka The condo-
minium at Park City ia to 
go To Vi REE Jr Y< to 
Sheryl + W T T [Madaka 
2. The findinft and conclusions entered by the 
trisi court as well as the appellate briefs of both 
parties, fail to ^«H«f»««h "intent" for these two 
different purposes. The distinction is pointed 
out in Note, Wills—Validity of Signature for 
Holographic Wills, 23 Ark.URev. 521 (1975). dis-
cussing Nelson v. Texarkana Historical Soc'y and 
Museum, 257 Ark. 394, 516 S.W.2d 882 (1974), 
and Smith v. MeeDoneU 252 Ark. 931, 4S1 
or Maaaka] My interest in 
Nevada Scratch to Go to 
Dorothy in Total 
home at 1378 Blaise Ave. 
until she remarries, after 
which the home shall be 
sold • lh go to her • V< to 
REE Jr. • V« to Sheryl 
Ana Ehekaon 
My Insurance to cover my 
interest in the floiladay 
store to go to Dorothy in 
Total—460,000 or more. 
other stock interests-
Some Zaoos Utah Bank 
[Craft or Croft] to go To 
Sheryl +. Bobby Share + 
Share alike 
On the basis of these writings, respon-
dent Misaka is churning a one-half interest 
in Erickson's Park City condominium. 
Without admission of the index cards to 
probate as a valid holographic will, Misaka 
takes nothing; the distribution of the prop-
erty is controlled by the terms of Erick-
son's formal 1956 wilL 
Although the parties and the court below 
seem to have focused on the broader issue 
of whether decedent intended these cards 
to be a will, the relevant inquiry is whether 
the evidence is sufficient to show decedent 
Erickson intended that his handwritten 
name near the top one of the cards be his 
signature.2 Misaka offered no evidence ex-
trinsic to the cards themselves as proof of 
Erickson's intent The trial court conclud-
ed the three index cards contained the "sig-
nature" required by section 75-2-503 for a 
valid holographic will, without specifying 
the particulars in the three cards relied on 
to implicitly find that Erickson intended his 
handwritten name to be his signature. 
This determination of the decedent's intent, 
based solely on the trial court's examina-
tion of the purported will, is a matter of 
law, see In re Love's Estate, 75 Utah 342, 
285 P. 299 (1930), which we review on ap-
peal under a correction-of-error standard. 
Western Kane County Special Serv. DisL 
No. 1 v. Jackson Cattle Co., 744 P.2d 1376, 
1378 (Utah 1987). 
[3] In the definitions provided by the 
legislature to guide construction of Utah 
S.W.2d 741 (1972). In Nelson, as in this 
the evidence extrinsic to the purported will itself 
went only to the question of general testamenta-
ry intent, i.e.. did the decedent intend the writ-
ing to be a wil l not to whether she intended her 
name in the body of the instrument to be her 
signature. Nelson, 257 Ark. at 398, 516 S.W^d 
at SS4. 
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inff ^ m ^ mark, or sign written with 
the mini to authenticate any instrument 
or writing/' Utah Code Ann. 
f 68-3-12(2)l» (1988). A decedent's hand-
written name in the body of the purported 
holographic will is not, by itself, prima 
facie evidence that the document contains 
the decedent's signature. In the context of 
section 75-2-503, such a handwritten name 
must have been written with the intent that 
it operate as an authentication of the doc-
ument as a will in order for it to be a 
signature. The purpose of our statutory 
scheme is to require a course of conduct 
which assures that a person's will is re-
duced to writing and, when handwritten, 
that the intention to have the writing take 
legal effect be indicated by a signature 
which records that fact The signature 
requirement shows that the writer finally 
approved the writing and meant for it to be 
operative as a testamentary instrument 
See Mechem, The Rule in Lemayne v. 
SUmI**, 29 Mich.LRev 685, 690-96 (1931). 
[41 Our review of the purported holo-
graphic will in this case leads us to con-
clude that it does not contain the signature 
required by the statute before it can be 
admitted to probate. The three cards in 
evidence are index cards on which only the 
unMned sides have been written. They 
were not attached to each other. There is 
no concluding language on any of the 
cards, and they otherwise give no indica-
tion that they are, taken together, a com-
pleted document Indeed, the nature of the 
note cards, the use of abbreviations, lack of 
punctuation, and the perfunctory, open-end-
ed wording strongly suggest that the 
cardans* a document are unfinished or 
rtinslHiittt a draft 
Although the handwritten name of the 
decedaat appears in the phrase "I Robert 
3L £ * , Smith v. MacDonabL 252 Ark. 931. 4S1 
SoWJtd 741 (1972) (handwritten name in title 
and exordium clause constitutes signature re-
quired by statute); In re Estate of Glass. 165 
CaLAppJd 330, 331 ?2d 1045 (195S) (handwrit-
ten name in ****A\f\% of document. This is 
Louis R. Glass"); Burton v. Bell 380 S.WJd 561 
(Tex.1964) (handwritten name in exordium 
dause, "That I Roy Wheeler Bell "is signa-
ture required for holographic will). But see In 
re Bernards Estate, 197 CaL 36. 239 P. 404 
E. Erickson do hereby state/' the writing 
contains nothing indicating the name was 
intended as the required executing signa-
ture. There is nothing on the face of the 
cards to affirmatively or by necessary im-
plication suggest that decedent wrote his 
name for any other purpose than to iden-
tify himself as the writer. See In re Ber-
nard's Estate, 197 CaL 36, 239 P. 404 
(1925); see generally, Annotation, Place of 
Signature of Holographic Wills, 19 A.L 
R.2d 926, 939-44 (1951). In short, there is 
no evidence that decedent's name was writ-
ten in the introductory clause on one card 
with the intent that it constitute authenti-
cation of one or all of the cards as a will. 
Respondent therefore, failed to make a 
prima facie showing that the purported 
holographic will contained the authenticat-
ing signature required by section 7&-2-603. 
[5] It is, of course, possible for a hand-
written name at the beginning of the body 
of a will to be written with the intent that 
it be the requisite signature.3 However, 
there must be support in the evidence for 
that intent Standing alone, it is equivocal, 
leaving the decedent's final approval and 
authentication of the writing in doubt 
Without more, it is an inadequate guard 
against writing being deleted, a possibility 
in this case if additional cards were written 
upon by Erickson only to be lost mis-
placed, or discarded by him or others. 
The final judgment and order of the trial 
court admitting the cards to probate as 
decedent's holographic will is vacated. 
Costs to appellant 
GARFF and BILLINGS, JJ., concur. 
(1925) (no intent that name in exordium be 
signature where document terminated abruptly 
after a specific bequest); Estate of Fegley, 42 
Colo-App. 47, 5S9 P.2d SO (1978) (phrase at end 
of instrument "witness my hand ..." followed 
by blank signature space indicates decedent in-
tended to sign later and did not intend hand-
written name in exordium clause to be her 
signature); Davis v. Davis, 86 Okla. 255, 207 P. 
1065 (1922) (same phrase and result as Feeiey). 
p-tf3-Si^ >->i'*± 
F'LED IN CLERKS OF 
Salt Lake County Ui 
C?" 151385 
J i DixonNji»rn.«»>. ^J\. 
DeMfv? 
Z xipuaddy 
PLAIN' 
., fXHI 
